Violence Prevention and Control Programs in the Navy:
A Review of Programs, Program Effectiveness, and Factors Affecting Program Success

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The prevalence of violence in everyday life is of universal concern. Terrorism, domestic violence, child abuse, and gang violence exemplify the types of violence that make people feel more vulnerable and cause them to feel that they exist in an increasingly violence-prone society.

This concern of the prevalence of violence in every day life is not limited to the civilian population. The U.S. military is increasingly concerned with the amount of violence that affects members in non-combat situations and that invades their family life.

The present study was proposed to provide a better understanding of the many programs that are in use designed to deal with violence and their effectiveness. At present the large number and variety of programs operating at different levels have not been coordinated nor comparatively assessed, which prevents the employment of a coherent, coordinated strategy for controlling violence in the Navy. The objectives of this study were (1) to identify and categorize the various violence control and prevention approaches and interventions that are currently used in the Navy, (2) to determine the nature of measurements used to assess effectiveness of these programs, and (3) to identify organizational and contextual factors which facilitate or inhibit attempts to reduce or eliminate violence.

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Foreword

This description and analysis of Navy Programs devoted to the prevention and control of violence was funded by a Studies and Analysis task under Program Element 0605152N. It was sponsored by the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Military Personnel Performance and Security, Corrections, and Programs Division.

The authors wish to thank the many professionals, both military and civilian, who gave freely of their time so that the interviews we conducted were meaningful and productive.

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Summary

Purpose

This study was conducted to provide a better understanding of the many Navy programs that are in use designed to deal with violence and their effectiveness. The objectives of this study were (1) to identify and categorize the various violence control and prevention approaches and interventions that are currently used in the Navy, (2) to determine the nature of measurements used to assess effectiveness of these programs, and (3) to identify organizational and contextual factors, which facilitate or inhibit attempts to reduce or eliminate violence.

Approach

Twenty-eight Navy commands participated in the study. The commands were selected to represent the Navy as a whole, and, thus, were balanced as to their location and type of command. At each command, individuals in four types of positions were targeted for participation: Security Officers, Crime Prevention Coordinators, Family Housing Directors, and Family Service Center Directors. A structured interview was developed for use with the study participants. The questions were designed to address the goals of identifying the violence prevention programs being conducted at each command, the extent to which the effectiveness of the programs had been determined, and the factors at the site that served as facilitators or inhibitors to violence prevention.

Findings

Several themes emerged from the interviews. First, the breath of the efforts to prevent and control violence Navy-wide is impressive. The crime prevention programs available to commands are comprehensive, encompassing a magnitude of topics. The diversity of services provided by Security, Crime Prevention programs, and Family Service Centers speaks to the complexity and magnitude of the problem of violence and the Navy's recognition of the problem.

Second, the professionals responsible for providing these services are dedicated, strongly committed, and proactive in their attempts to remove or reduce the risks of violence.

Several of the obstacles identified by the interviewees, which are systemic in nature, pose special problems. Reorganization and downsizing, for example, seriously affect their ability to control and prevent violence, not only because of the reduction in personnel and resources for security and crime prevention, but also because of the potential for increased levels of violence.

Third, despite the formal Navy policy that supports security and crime prevention programs, the interviewees reported that there are indications of less than full support and

sufficient awareness of violence prevention efforts on the part of Navy leadership and, to some extent, sailors and their families.

Fourth, with some exceptions, more research evaluation initiatives are needed. Inadequate evaluation data for the majority of crime prevention efforts makes it impossible to assess with certainty the effectiveness of current approaches.

Finally, the success of a program at a particular site, in large measure, is a result of the dedication and ingenuity of the individuals running the program.

Recommendations

Based on the information obtained in this study of Navy violence prevention and control programs, a number of recommendations were offered. They ranged from the possible organizational restructuring of various Navy entities, including law enforcement, to research proposals for the conduct of comprehensive program evaluation efforts.

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Introduction

The prevalence of violence in everyday life is of universal concern. Terrorism, domestic violence, child abuse, and gang violence exemplify the types of violence that make people feel more vulnerable and cause them to feel that they exist in an increasingly violence-prone society. The National Academy of Science Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior concluded that, "[w]hile present murder and other violent crime rates per capita are not unprecedented for the United States in this century, they are among the highest in the industrialized world" (Roth, 1994). There is a growing concern that there is too much violence and that prevention and intervention strategies must be developed to control and decrease it.

Dark streets and bad neighborhoods are not the only places in which people fall victim to violence. The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics crime survey reports that one million people in the U.S. become victims of violent crimes in the workplace annually (Miles, 1995). There has been a dramatic increase in the number of gangs and gang members in the past two decades, and gang violence involves and affects people in the workplace and their communities (Greengard, 1996; Brantley & DeRosa, 1994). Teens, a clear target for gangs, are now reportedly more likely to resort to violence (Rancer & Kosberg, 1994), and homicide has become the leading cause of death for black males aged 15-34 (Moore, Prothrow-Stith, Guyer, & Spivak, 1994). Violence in the home involves adults and children, with spousal and child abuse on the rise. A report just released by the Department of Health and Human Services estimates the number of children who are neglected and abused increased 98 percent from 1986 to 1993 (*San Diego Union (1996, September 1996)* p. A9.

This concern of the prevalence of violence in every day life is not limited to the civilian population. The U.S. military is increasingly concerned with the amount of violence that affects members in non-combat situations and that invades their family life. An exploratory study of violence in the Navy (Sheposh, Dutcher, Rosen, & Ralston, 1995) revealed that the Navy situation mirrored that found in the civilian sector-- although the systems for reporting and monitoring violent acts are flawed and probably underrepresented the true level of violence, they document a steady and fairly high level of violence involving Navy members.

Violence of all types is of concern to the military due to its involvement in and responsibility for service members and their families 24 hours a day. Violence in the workplace is occurring at military bases as well as in the civilian workplace. Highly publicized cases, such as the shooting of two supervisors by a Marine at Camp Pendleton in San Diego, California (Himmelspach, Daniels, & Dibble,1996), are but some of the instances of violence occurring in the military workplace and represent the extremes. Less obtrusive forms of violence, such as intimidation, verbal abuse, and sexual assaults, also occur on-base and produce a threatening and fearful climate (Miles, 1995).

Military family violence is seen as increasing due to new pressures placed on service members and their families. In addition to the traditional stresses of frequent relocations

and long absences of the deployed parent, downsizing and career uncertainties are putting additional pressures on military families. Detailed in a 1994 *Time* article entitled, "The Living Room War," military families are experiencing high levels of domestic violence (Thompson, 1994). Reported cases of violence in military families jumped from 27,783 in 1986 to 46,287 in 1993. Each week nearly 1,000 formal complaints involving violence are filed against military members and one person is killed by a family member in the service (Thompson, 1994). According to military officials, domestic violence figures have increased since the mid-1980s. Substantiated spousal abuse cases reportedly rose from 12 per 1,000 in 1988 to 18.1 per 1,000 in 1993 (Skidmore, 1994). According to Gail McGinn, a Pentagon personnel official, as reported in Thompson, 1994, the frequent movement of families and the long absences of a spouse add pressure to military members and families, which some cannot withstand.

Teenage children of military members are at special risk from the stressful lifestyle, and potential gang membership is of particular concern. The *Air Force Times*, for example, reported that nearly half of 296 male teenagers from military families who participated in a program aimed at helping youths make the transition from boyhood to manhood, at Camp Pendleton, California, reported being involved in gangs (Jowers, 1994).

A wide variety of programs have been developed to respond to and prevent the many types of violence that affect military families. Personnel from the base security forces and social services, such as the Family Service Centers (FSCs), are most likely to develop and deliver such programs. In some cases, the specific programs are mandated at a Navy or Department of Defense (DoD) level, and in other cases, unique programs are developed at individual bases to respond to local needs.

The present study was proposed to provide a better understanding of the many programs that are in use designed to deal with violence and their effectiveness. At present, the large number and variety of programs operating at different levels have not been coordinated nor comparatively assessed, which prevents the employment of a coherent, coordinated strategy for controlling violence in the Navy. The objectives of this study were (1) to identify and categorize the various violence control and prevention approaches and interventions that are currently used in the Navy, (2) to determine the nature of measurements used to assess effectiveness of these programs, and (3) to identify organizational and contextual factors which facilitate or inhibit attempts to reduce or eliminate violence.

Approach

Participating Commands

Twenty-eight Navy commands participated in the study. The commands were selected to represent the Navy as a whole, and, thus, were balanced as to their location and the type of command. They included naval bases, submarine bases, amphibious bases, naval stations and naval air stations, aircraft carriers, a fleet activity, and a

weapons station. Thirteen sites were in the Pacific Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR), 15 in the Atlantic AOR, and, of those, 5 of the commands were located outside the continental U.S. The selected commands are listed below.

COMNAVFOR Marianas
COMNAVBASE Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
COMNAVBASE Norfolk, Virginia
COMNAVBASE Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMFLEACT Yokosuka, Japan
SUBASE Bangor, Washington
SUBASE Kings Bay, Georgia
SUBASE New London, Connecticut
NAVPHIBASE Little Creek, Virginia
NAVPHIBASE San Diego, California
NAS Brunswick, Maine
NAS Cecil Field, Florida
NAS Fallon, Nevada
NAS Jacksonville, Florida

NAS Key West, Florida
NAS Lamoore, California
NAS North Island, California
NAS Oceana, Virginia
NAS Whidby Island, Washington
NAVSTA Everett, Washington
NAVSTA Ingleside, Texas
NAVSTA Mayport, Florida
NAVSTA San Diego, California
WPNSTA Concord, California
NSF Diego Garcia
USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64)
USS ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
USS STENNIS (CVN 74)

Interviewees

At each command, individuals in four types of positions were targeted for participation—Security Officers, Crime Prevention Coordinators, Family Housing Directors, and FSC Directors. Security Officers and Crime Prevention Coordinators were selected because of their formal involvement with violence and violence prevention programs. Family Housing Directors were included in the sample due to their involvement with domestic and family violence that occurs within Navy housing. FSC Directors were selected due to their involvement in programs and counseling focused on prevention and intervention for violence involving service members and their families. In addition, since overall program management of the Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is normally the responsibility of the FSC Director, in his or her role as the Family Advocacy Officer (FAO), the Service Center Directors were thought to also be in a position to provide information specific to Family Advocacy programs and treatment.

Each of the participating commands did not always have four individuals in the targeted positions. The role of Crime Prevention Coordinator, for example, might be held by the Security Officer at a smaller base, and, therefore, only one person would participate in the interview and represent both positions. Also, some bases did not have Housing Directors. In geographic areas that contain numerous bases, for example in San Diego, one Housing Director serves numerous commands and represented more than one in the interview. Aircraft carriers, as another example, do not have FSCs. However, each site did have a Security Officer. Interviews were conducted with the numbers of participants listed below:

Security Officers	28
Crime Prevention Coordinators	23

Family Housing Directors   20
Family Service Center Directors   23

Interviews

A structured interview was developed for use with the study participants. The questions were designed to address the goals of identifying the violence prevention programs being conducted at each command, the extent to which the effectiveness of the programs had been determined, and the factors at the site that served as facilitators or inhibitors to violence prevention. The structured interview questions are shown in Appendix A.

Five researchers served as interviewers in the study. The majority of the interviews were conducted by telephone, with one researcher conducting the interview. The exception was the first set of interviews conducted. To obtain consistency of style among the five interviewers, the initial interviews were conducted on-site with representatives from NAVSTA San Diego, California. All interviewers participated in these on-site interviews to develop a consistent approach that was then applied by each interviewer in his/her telephone interviews.

Programs

The individuals interviewed represented a diverse community of professionals; both military and civilian. As previously stated, they included Security Officers, Crime Prevention Coordinators, FSC Directors, and Directors of Navy Family Housing. They were diverse, both in terms of organizational responsibilities, and in their perspectives on issues related to the control and prevention of crime and violence. These differences influenced the nature of the information generated, which covered a wide variety of programs designed to either prevent, control, or treat the consequences of violence. All interviewees were found to be highly committed and involved in attempting to improve Quality of Life for service members and their families, and in the creation of a violence-free environment within the Navy.

Organizational Overview

The various programs identified by the interviewees tended to fall into three major categories, or levels: (1) policing and primary deterrence; (2) briefs, training and workshops; and (3) services provided to victims or perpetrators after violence has occurred. There was a substantial commonality of programs across the targeted sites. Some of the sites contacted, however, reported a greater number and variety of programs than others. This was not unexpected. Local conditions, for example, geography, isolation, rural versus urban areas, site size, funding, quality of command support, and local requirements, such as problems of violence specific to a given site, understandably influence overall program considerations. Even though there may be mandated core

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programs, as is the case with the Navy's FSCs, special circumstances specific to a given site, justify creation of programs outside of core requirements.

First Level Programs: Policing and Primary Deterrence

The first level has as its focus law enforcement and physical security. The level is divided into two general areas: Community Oriented Policing, and General Deterrence.

Community Oriented Policing

Community Oriented Policing is characterized by activities or programs such as Volunteer Citizens Patrols, Neighborhood Watch, Police Bicycle Patrols, special police patrols for Navy Family Housing, and the establishment of neighborhood Safe Houses or Havens, for children who have become frightened, or at risk.

General Deterrence

General Deterrence contains standard police and crime prevention activities, including: regular police patrols, investigations, home and personal safety assessments, physical security and lighting surveys, anti-theft property identification, and workplace security.

Second Level Programs: Briefs, Training and Workshops

The second level is a mixture of prevention and control programs conducted by Family Services, Security, Crime Prevention, and Housing. Although all four groups are represented within this level, the primary provider is the FSC; responsible for over 50 percent of the programs offered.

Briefs

The Briefing programs are illustrated by a variety of regularly scheduled, or specially requested offerings including: domestic violence, rape awareness, spousal and child abuse prevention, violence awareness, drug and alcohol awareness, and various briefs specifically targeted for teens in the areas of sexual abuse, rape awareness, gangs, and peer pressure.

Training and Workshops

The more extensive training and workshop sessions cover an extremely broad spectrum of programs related to the prevention and control of violence. Representative programs include sessions on personal safety, and how to avoid becoming an innocent victim; conflict management seminars, and workshops dealing with domestic violence, crime prevention, family considerations and factors related to return and reunion, post-deployment, anger management, and stress reduction. Programs such as Financial Assistance Training and Counseling are also included. Although on the surface these latter programs seem to bear little relationship to violence, problems of a financial nature have often been found to be a significant factor in the incidence of domestic violence.

Within this level is also an appropriate place to cite the frequently-mentioned New Parent Support Team program. New mothers who are considered to be potentially at risk are provided with a substantial amount of support, including frequent home visits. Finally, a number of programs have been implemented in hopes of having a positive impact on children and teens. These programs, offered to both children and parents, include Officer Friendly, McGruff, Self Esteem for Kids, Youth at Risk (Drug and Alcohol Awareness), DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), and Child at Risk programs that provide an awareness of factors related to child neglect.

Third Level Programs: Victim and Perpetrator Services

The third level is composed of a number of programs designed to provide intensive intellectual and emotional support to people at risk. These programs also assist service members and their families in coping with the effects of previous violent incidents or periods in which they were either victims or perpetrators. It is within this level that many of the programs and activities associated with the FAP are found. These include programs such as battery therapy for victims and batterers, counseling and support programs for children who have witnessed violent crime, marriage counseling, support groups for battered women, counseling and support programs for adults who were molested as children, and the Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program.

The programs comprising the general program categories illustrate the wide range and number of approaches employed by the Navy to deal with crime and violence. All of the programs are designed to enhance the safety and security, both physical and emotional, of our service members, their families, and our civilian employees. In reviewing these many programs, the creativity exhibited by Navy managers and professional staff stands out clearly. The Navy's ability to develop violence prevention or control programs, in response to emergent needs, is limited for the most part by the availability of financial resources. In addition to those cited above, more programs were identified by our respondents. A complete listing of their responses can be found in Appendix B.

Measures of Program Effectiveness

The interviewees were questioned about the effectiveness of their programs. What kinds of feedback did they receive? What measurement system was used to evaluate program effectiveness, i.e., in what ways were they able to determine that their program approaches were, in fact, working?

As presented in Table 1, the most commonly cited measure involved frequency data in crime reports (24%).

Table 1

Effectiveness Measures

Organization	Sec Off	FSC	Frequency CPC	Housing	Total	Percent
Statistical Reports	14	4	16	3	37	24
Number of Participants (usage)	5	5	2	0	12	8
Number of Requests for Services	1	1	0	3	5	3
Customer Satisfaction Reports	2	3	3	2	10	7
Verbal Feedback	5	5	8	3	21	14
Trainer Feedback	0	10	2	0	12	8
Subjective Assessments	2	5	1	1	9	6
Need Assessment Surveys	1	3	1	2	7	5
Letters of Commendation	4	3	6	1	14	9
Awards	3	0	1	0	4	2
No Formal Measures	5	5	2	9	21	14
Total	**42**	**44**	**42**	**24**	**152**	**100**

Other statistical measures included simple counts, such as number of program participants (8%), and requests for service (3%). When questioned about the availability of actual measures, the respondents indicated that few systematic quantitative measures were being used. The individuals who were contacted were much more likely to cite a variety of other reasons to explain their impressions. Generally, their responses were made on an impressionistic basis. The following are representative interviewee comments:

Crime Reports

- *We judge effectiveness by whether the crime rate has dropped. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *Our crime statistics are our indicator of how well we're handling crime. (Security Officer)*

- *Major feedback is the number of violent incident reports we get from the police. (Director of Housing)*

Program Participants

- *We feel that programs are effective when the number of participants increases with each subsequent program. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *A way of gauging effectiveness is the number of personnel and/or dependents who utilize the FSC offerings each year. (Family Service Center)*

Requests for Service

- The *greater the number of requests for services, the more effective we are. (Security Officer)*

- *We must be effective because we get a great deal of positive feedback from Commands, with requests to help set up prevention programs. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

The next four indices of effectiveness are primarily composed of feedback information that is anecdotal in nature, and as such, is relatively more subjective. The elements in this grouping consist of various customer satisfaction reports (7%), verbal feedback from customers and Commanding Officers (14%), end of training evaluation comments (8%), and subjective assessments by management or staff (6%). The following comments serve to illustrate each of the elements:

Customer Satisfaction

- *We get very positive customer satisfaction evaluations. (Family Service Center)*

- *We can base a large portion of our effectiveness on reports received from our customers. (Security Officer)*

- *We send out a customer satisfaction survey twice a year asking how we're doing. The last time we got a B+. (Housing)*

Verbal Feedback

- *We get a lot of compliments. (Family Service Center)*

- *If we don't get any negative feedback from the residents, we're doing a good job. (Housing)*

- *I'm effective if I receive positive feedback* from the customers. *(Crime Prevention Coordinators)*

Training Evaluations

- *We get written assessments of lectures and workshops. (Crime Prevention Coordinators)*

- We get great reviews. We give *critique* sheets at the end of classes. We know we're effective because the critique sheets are always positive. *(Family Service Center)*

Subjective Assessments

- *Another way is on a case by case basis. You know programs are successful when you see the family situations turned around. (Family Service Center)*

- *There is no indication of violence, so we must be doing well. (Housing)*

- *I know we're effective if we get a smile on the Senior Chief's face, and a handshake from the C.O. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

The last set of measures represent more systematic or formal assessments of effectiveness. These elements, needs assessment surveys (5%), formal letters of evaluation and appreciation (9%), and awards (2%), may have greater value with respect to program planning and determination of effectiveness. The following are representative comments:

Needs Assessment

- We conduct an annual Needs Assessment *Survey to see how we are doing. (Family Service Center)*

- *A Needs Assessment Survey is provided for planning purposes. (Security Officer)*

Letters

- *We receive Commendations and thank you notes from parents, teachers, and schools. (Crime Prevention Officer)*

- *We assess our quality and customer satisfaction from formal "comment cards", and letters of commendation and appreciation. (Family Service Center)*

Awards

- *We judge our effectiveness by customer feedback and our awards. (Security Officer)*

- *The Crime Prevention Unit has received over 175 letters of commendation and/or appreciation. The Navy I.G. calls it "Probably the best Crime Prevention Unit operating in the Navy." (Security Officer)*

The final 14 percent represents the interviewees who indicated that they had no means of accurately determining program effectiveness. The following comments are representative:

- *We have no way of telling. I don't know how you would do that! (Director of Housing)*

- *There is no good way to measure the effectiveness of crime prevention. You can compile statistics, but it takes a long time to notice if there is a decline. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *We have no specific measurement tool. It is very very hard to measure. (Family Service Center)*

- *We don't really know. All we have are the numbers, contacts, and stats. (Security Department)*

Clearly there is a lack of systematic, methodologically sound measurement of the effectiveness of violence prevention programs. Although the current measurement efforts are not at the preferred level, they are not without value. Proper assessment generates information that permits valid conclusions regarding outcomes by those responsible for control and prevention. Often circumstances limit the ability to conduct proper program evaluation. In these cases, even minimal outcome data have value in ascertaining the utility of the programs. In one instance for example, a Crime Prevention Coordinator reported, "We had a decrease in bicycle thefts after we increased bicycle

registration." In another example, a FSC director stated, "We know we're effective if the Service Member is no longer involved in violent incidents after having attended our programs."

Some of the existing methods of determining effectiveness described by the interviewees attempted to link outcome data with interventions. An example of this was provided by a Crime Prevention Coordinator who stated: "We analyze the number of incidents, then conduct an educational program for prevention, and evaluate the stats again after six months to see if anything has changed."

In conclusion, the information provided by interviewees suggests that methods of evaluation range from non-existent to serious attempts at quantification. Differing situational factors warrant widely differing evaluative methods, and certain measures which may be of utility at one location may not be at others. Among the other considerations regarding the accurate assessment of the incidence of violence, as well as the effect of existing control and prevention programs, is the ability to take into account the multiple factors that could influence an outcome in the real world. This requires highly sophisticated and detailed evaluation to be certain the outcomes observed are actually the result of the program in question. Comments provided by interviewees suggest they were aware of the problem. One Security Officer observed: "Traditional crime statistics may reveal problem areas or patterns, and where we have implemented a prevention-oriented program, it may appear that crime has decreased. But a number of other factors could have caused the decrease."

Impediments to Successful Violence Prevention and Control

The interview schedule included questions about the organizational and contextual factors affecting violence control and prevention programs. Specifically, interviewees were asked whether such factors as lack of training materials and insufficient support from management impeded the execution of the programs at their respective facilities. Table 2 presents the number of interviewees who indicated that these factors posed problems in controlling and preventing crime and violence. As can be seen in Table 2, interviewees most frequently mentioned insufficient funding, followed by the need for training and the Navy community's lack of commitment and support for programs.

Table 2

Impediments to Implementing and Running Programs

	Yes	No	Percent Yes
Lack of Documentation	10	52	16
Insufficient Training	18	39	32
Insufficient Funding	47	34	58
Insufficient Support	14	61	19
Inter-organizational Coordination	10	49	17
Problems	--	--	--
Lack of Navy Community Support and	20	50	29
Involvement	--	--	--

Documentation

Sixteen percent of the interviewees expressed concern about lack of documentation that they feel is needed to run the programs. Among the interviewees comments are the following:

- *I don't know how to get comprehensive information on crime prevention and how to run a program. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *Lack of historical data places a handicap on current security and crime prevention operations. (Security Officer)*

- *We have some difficulty in obtaining timely materials and guidance. (Family Service Center Director)*

Training

A much larger percentage (32%) reported problems associated with lack of training. Several observed that crime prevention programs are suffering because of funding constraints on training. Presented below are some examples of the interviewees' concerns about training.

- *There is a lack of training on how to best handle violent confrontations in the housing areas. (Director of Housing)*

- *The programs could use more commercially produced training materials. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *The lack of cross training between programs, including patrols affects the efficacy of the overall program. (Security Officer)*

Funding and Staffing

The most frequently mentioned issue was the concern over financial support for staffing and other needs; 58 percent of the interviewees reported that it is a problem. The following examples of problems reported by Security Officers, Crime Prevention Coordinators, and FSC directors are presented below:

Security Officers

- *We are short of funding for crime prevention programs and TAD training.*

- *Funding cuts will result in 30% reduction in staff (9545's).*

- *We have a lack of funding to send people to appropriate training classes and schools, especially violence control programs.*

- *As a result of lower funding there is a lack of professionally trained and academically educated peers to staff our programs.*

Crime Prevention Coordinators

- *We have to trade off on important competing priorities because of a limited budget.*

- *Because of the funding problem, we had to get money from MWR just to operate the crime prevention programs.*

- *Funding, especially for training, is a problem. Our people often go on leave and travel at their own expense to get training in the U.S.*

Family Service Center Directors

- *The biggest problem is that we can't do any long range planning because we don't know if funding will be available.*

- *Funding is not adequate to cover all the required domestic violence prevention programs, and there is insufficient funding and staff to cover the unfunded, but mandated programs so other program suffer.*

- *We are very concerned that funding for SAVI will be eliminated.*

Management Support

The interviewees characterized the support, commitment, and cooperation of the Navy command structure and base commanders as strong and positive. The large majority of interviewees described the Navy commands as very supportive of crime and violence control efforts. For example, they were seen as strongly advocating community oriented policing. However, 19 percent of the interviewees indicated that insufficient support from management, primarily from tenant commands, posed a problem. The

interviewees tended to see insufficient support more as a reflection of lack of awareness of problems with violence or concern over carrying out their mission rather than direct resistance to the programs. Furthermore, there is a question as to how knowledgeable the Navy command structure and base commanders are with respect to the programs that currently exist. The following are examples of interviewees' comments:

- *Commands are not unsupportive, but they really don't have an awareness of how important these programs are. (Family Service Center Director)*

- *Commanders don't want to believe that family violence and child sex abuse happens....too many officers and Chiefs get off. (Family Service Center Director)*

- *The relationship with BUPERS could be better, they tend to take a short view of programs. (Family Service Center Director).*

- *Management does not sufficiently emphasize the worth of crime prevention. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *Local commands evidence insufficient interest and/or intervention in domestic violence cases. (Housing).*

Inter-Organizational Coordination

Overall, interviewees reported strong working relationships with other agencies. A number of Security Officers noted that they worked closely with the FSC, FAP, and Housing, and that they had good relationships with local authorities and Navy organizations. In addition they reported good relationships with Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and with the local police departments in the civilian community. Directors of Housing, FSC Directors, and Crime Prevention Coordinators provided similar characterizations of good inter-agency cooperation and coordination. As one Crime Prevention Coordinator stated, "coordination and integration with other organizations is more than outstanding."

Seventeen percent reported problems with lack of coordination or integration with other organizations and service community groups. Problems mentioned include:

- *We have problems with continuing personnel attendance at the longer prevention and counseling programs due to deployment schedules and undermanned shifts. CO's don't feel they can afford to release people for extended periods--even when it is the best thing for the service member and the Navy in the long run. (Family Service Center Director)*

- *We would like a better relationship with NCIS, they don't follow up with completed investigative information. (Director of Housing)*

- *Interaction with tenant commands is not very good, there is little follow through on ICR dispositions. (Security Officer)*

- *Law enforcement and crime prevention is not given as much priority as it should. (Security Officer)*

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- *We have problems working with civilians, especially when a low ranking person has to give orders to a high ranking civilian. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

Several FSC directors commented specifically about the relationship between the FSC, FAP, and the operational Navy.

- *Local Commands don't like FAP; they don't want to lose their people to counseling.*

- *Cooperation between FAP and other Navy organizations is not well developed. There is a lack of interdisciplinary and interagency approach.*

- *FAP is seen as a punitive program by the troops.*

- *Service members are fearful of having any contact with the Family Service Center, they regard it as a career inhibitor.*

- *Because Naval operations are under increasingly high pressure, the fleet commanders regard the FSC programs as not worthy of their time.*

Complacency/Lack of Community Involvement

Complacency and lack of involvement with the control and prevention of violence were identified as problems by 29 percent of the interviewees. Observations from interviewees included:

- *Within our Navy community, complacency is our biggest problem, people are not willing to accept any responsibility for their own security. (Security Officer)*

- *Interaction with tenant commands is not very good, they aren't interested in crime prevention. (Security Officer)*

- *The local community is very responsive to our efforts, but the Navy community is not particularly involved until something happens. (Security Officer)*

- *We need Neighborhood Watch, but the residents aren't interested, they are unwilling to contribute their time and effort. (Housing)*

- *It's hard to get people involved in programs, "the old, crusty enlisted leadership" is not interested, they are opposed to change. (Family Service Center director)*

- *The biggest problem is getting people to participate. If we could quadruple participation in prevention programs (proactive counseling) then we would be successful. (Family Service Center director)*

- *It is difficult to run a Neighborhood Watch program in the military residences or neighborhoods. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *People rotate too frequently to get involved in programs. (Security Officer)*

Additional Problems

The interviewees also identified other factors that they felt influenced the effectiveness of existing programs. Among the factors they cited were: location and size of facilities, downsizing, need for new programs, excessive paperwork, and privatization of services.

The interviewee comments concerning location and size of facilities and military residences and their effect on program efficacy are presented below:

- *The smallness of the local community with a rapidly growing Navy population is causing the local Police Department to begin losing patience with younger sailors in town. (Family Service Center Director)*

- *We have problems hiring staff because of geographical isolation. The pool of applicants for replacements is limited. (Family Service Center Director)*

- *When we have 30-50% staff turnover, it hurts programs because replacements are not readily available. (Family Service Center Director)*

- *There are problems in the older housing areas-- with not enough space and less comfortable surroundings domestic violence increases. (Director of Housing)*

Base closures have resulted in personnel from multiple locations being consolidated at one base. At the same time, downsizing of departments and agencies at these suddenly overcrowded bases puts greater stresses on existing security and crime and violence prevention programs. Examples of interviewee comments on how this situation affects programs follow:

- *The increasing military population leads to the inability to control effectively, especially domestic violence. (Director of Housing)*

- *Downsizing is a problem. There is too much to do and too few people available to implement the programs. The population growth in the region (i.e. arrival of new ships) will increase rivalry and potential for violence. (Security Officer)*

- *Because of Security Department downsizing, the problem is to get tenant commands to become more responsible for their own security. (Security Officer)*

Interviewees from several different facilities expressed a need for new programs to deal with developing and recurring problems. They feel there are serious gaps in their programs, especially in the area of drugs and teen aggression. Comments from interviewees included:

- *We urgently need the creation of some organization within the Navy that specifically targets drug and alcohol prevention for teens. This is a real gap in our approach to controlling violence. (Family Service Center director)*

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- *There should be more work done with young sailors regarding domestic violence. (Crime Prevention Officer)*

- *We need more training about violence in the workplace. (Family Service Center director)*

- *We need to do more in prevention and awareness of domestic violence we must improve our ability to identify those likely to act out. (Housing)*

The advent of more relaxed security postures at bases such as the "open gate" policy also was of concern, particularly for Security Officers. The general feeling is that the "open gate" policy increases the potential for more violence and crime on bases. This may actually generate more new violence than merely impede the control and prevention of violence. This is reflected in the comments from interviewees:

- *We have become an open base. That may add to an emerging problem for gangs and drugs coming on base. (Security Officer)*

- *The open gate policy is a problem, crime comes in from the outside and there are more civilian/military fights in the open clubs. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

A few interviewees mentioned excessive reporting requirements as an impediment.

- *The reporting system is much too burdensome and time consuming.*

- *The reporting system is overly bureaucratic.*

- *Headquarters imposes excessive paperwork requirements.*

Of particular concern for the FSC Directors was the issue of privatization and its effect on the services provided. This concern was reflected in their responses:

- *Privatization is an emerging problem and it will not provide the same quality of service necessary for a sense of family.*

- *The most serious problem is the consideration of making the Family Service Center a commercial activity, and outsourcing all the services.*

- *The prevention programs may have to be cut so as to be competitive with just the mandated programs.*

- *Privatization would reduce more innovative programs.*

- *We feel the privatization will work reasonably well with the multi-service contract, but not so well with any outreach programs, it is too difficult to find qualified people for what a contract would pay.*

In summary, the interviewees identified a wide variety of factors that potentially inhibit the implementation of security or violence and crime prevention programs. The factor that was seen as the greatest impediment was funding and staffing of programs. Interviewees expressed concerns about how shortcomings in this area could limit their ability to design and implement new programs to attack emerging problems, or to even

adequately run mandated programs. Other factors mentioned included complacency and lack of community involvement and lack of training. The need for cross training to more effectively utilize limited numbers of personnel, for example, was mentioned by more than one interviewee. Very few of the problems mentioned were site specific or restricted to type of position (with the exception of privatization of the FSCs). Despite the litany of problems, the interviewees made very clear the fact that at present they are capable of meeting the challenges for maintaining security and controlling crime and violence. The problems they identified were seen as limiting them from doing more, or inhibiting them from meeting increasing challenges posed by emerging trends and the potential for increased violence. In the event of higher demands for services or the threat of new crises, concern was expressed regarding their ability to serve at the present level of effectiveness.

Specific Crime and Violence Problem Areas

The observations in the preceding section call attention to some of the problems associated with the implementation and execution of effective crime and violence prevention. This section reports on the views of these professionals concerning the forms of violence expressed in the Navy community. The three most prevalent types of problems according to interviewees were: domestic violence, juvenile crime (by dependents), and alcohol and drugs. In addition, gangs and gang-like activities were seen as being the most critical emerging problem. Examples of comments from interviewees:

Domestic Violence

• *Spousal abuse seems to be a significant problem. It is extremely difficult to get through to the younger abusers. (Security Officer)*

• *There has been an increase in domestic violence. (Security Officer)*

• *Two primary problems have been alcohol and domestic abuse. (Security Officer)*

• *Domestic violence is increasing. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

• *Increasing family violence is occurring in military housing. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

• *Individual and family problems of all kinds, including family violence, is likely to increase with longer deployments. (Family Service Center Director)*

• *The numbers of domestic violence are not going down, especially child abuse, which is increasing. (Family Service Center Director)*

• *Most problems are domestic disputes, domestic violence is increasing. (Director of Housing)*

• *Increasing military population in this area has lead to an inability to effectively control domestic violence. (Director of Housing)*

Juvenile Crime

- *There is a high incidence of crimes by dependents and limited options for dealing with them. (Security Officer)*

- *Juveniles are a very real problem, they get into serious trouble, but their attitude is, "you can't do anything to me, I'm a kid." (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *We have some juvenile delinquency problems. They are worse in overseas bases. (Family Service Center Director)*

- *The problem with troubled youths is increasing. (Family Service Center Director)*

- *Kid to kid aggression is becoming more severe. (Director of Housing)*

- *Delinquent dependent children assaulting each other is a big problem. (Director of Housing)*

- *The emerging problem for control and prevention involves teens. (Director of Housing)*

- *Physical clashes between civilian and Navy kids are becoming more frequent. (Director of Housing)*

Drugs and Alcohol

- *Drugs are getting worse. (Security Officer)*

- *There is a persistent drug problem. (Security Officer)*

- *There are two primary problems that are linked; alcohol and domestic abuse. (Security Officer)*

- *We have problems with drug dealing in housing areas. (Director of Housing)*

- *We are seeing more drinking and more fights. (Security Officer)*

Gangs

- *We seem to be getting more gangs. (Security Officer)*

- *Gang activity is increasing. We need more information on understanding gangs. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *Gangs are becoming a big problem. (Security Officer)*

- *We have a problem with emerging gang activity. (Security Officer)*

- *There is increased gang activity on ships. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *We have an emerging problem with juvenile gangs starting up. (Security Officer)*

Among some of the other problems mentioned were the following:

- *There is a continuing problem with date rape. (Security Officer)*

- *A significant problem is that we now have females on board. We have started a SAVI program, but various departments on ship aren't equipped to respond to this kind of (sexual) violence. (Security Officer)*

- *There has been an upsurge in workplace violence, blue on blue, at service school commands. (Security Officer)*

- *There is growing workplace violence. (Security Officer)*

- *Most violence takes place in clubs and involves sailor on sailor. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *There are more civilian/military fights in the open clubs. (Crime Prevention Coordinator)*

- *Increase in sailor to sailor violence on base. (Family Service Center Director)*

Of the current problems, domestic violence seems to be of the most concern to interviewees. This is consistent with statistics indicating the rapid increase in the rates of spousal abuse and family violence in the last decade (Skidmore, 1994; "Child abuse, neglect double," 1996). This concern expressed by interviewees may also in part be a reflection of the higher proportion of married military enlisted personnel. Of the other emerging problems identified, the influx of gangs and gang activity also were of great concern to interviewees. Overall, the forms of violence the interviewees identified as most problematic parallel those that are of concern in the civilian population.

Recommendations from Interviewees

The final question in the interview schedule asked interviewees for their recommendations and observations about crime prevention and related issues. Below are representative recommendations, classified by the four groups of interviewees: Security Officers, Crime Prevention Coordinators, FSC Directors, and Directors of Housing.

Security Officers

Security Officers offered numerous recommendations to improve their ability to carry out their job. These topics included the status accorded the security department, criticisms of organizational structure, personnel suggestions, communications between security departments, and image control.

- *We urgently need to implement a long term investment-type strategy for security departments and violence and crime prevention.*

- *The Navy needs to make law enforcement a high priority. It's a QOL issue, but no one seems to want to give it what it deserves.*

- *Security should have reporting systems like the Air Force, i.e. report directly to Headquarters, not the local CO.*

- *The whole concept of law enforcement in the Navy should be changed. The Navy should be organized like the Army and Air Force. They have a Provost Marshal. This way matters could be carried beyond the base. Too much stuff gets swept under the rug in the Navy.*

- *We need more female investigators aboard ships to handle assault cases now that we are sexually integrated.*

- *We need to shift to greater numbers of civilians working in base security. We'll get better continuity without the military turnover.*

- *We already have Physical Security/Law Enforcement Quarterly Regional Meetings, but we urgently need quarterly regional meetings for Crime Prevention Coordinators and Security Directors so that we can exchange relevant information.*

- *We need some kind of "image control" for base security--we're not the bad guys, we're the good guys who serve you.*

Crime Prevention Coordinators

Among the suggestions offered by the Crime Prevention Coordinators are the following: Upgrading the Crime Prevention Coordinator position, enhancing the skills and knowledge of Crime Prevention Coordinators, changing the attitudes of Commanders towards crime prevention and violence, generating a Navy crime trend data base, and the development of more crime prevention programs for single sailors.

- *There is a need to make crime prevention a line item in the Security Department's budget. The way it is now, it's almost impossible to do anything but "piecemeal" planning.*

- *Make crime prevention a specialized division within the Security Department, like Patrol. It's important for working relationships to have equal status, and acknowledge the importance of Crime prevention*

- *We need to become more educated in the crime prevention field. We need some way of getting better access to what is going on in civilian crime prevention.*

- *We feel that it's really important to be able to get help from other bases, especially for training materials.*

- *We need to be able to conveniently get crime prevention information and successful approaches from other bases.*

- *We need a way to receive more training in Spousal and Child Abuse/Domestic Violence prevention. Make more courses available.*

- *There should be more crime prevention programs for single sailors.*

- *Someone needs to develop a Navy crime trend data base that can provide useful planning information.*

- *The commanders of military units must learn to hold their people more accountable in violence related crimes.*

- *Security must be taken more seriously by Navy management.*

Family Service Center Directors

The majority of FSC Directors suggested ways violence control and prevention could be improved. Two recommended a change in the design of family service programs. Five more discussed the need to change the way Navy leadership deals with domestic violence. Others mentioned the need to deal with lack of funding, the need for new programs, and developing ways to track and measure violence.

- *We need an improved interdisciplinary approach to domestic violence. The current design is inadequate.*

- *You cannot design family services programs overseas on a CONUS model. The support information in the U.S. doesn't exist overseas. It might require more personnel and money.*

- *We try to treat all family abuse, but the unit commanders control who gets diverted to treatment. The more valued the offender, the less likely that he or she will be released for treatment-even in critical cases. This should be changed.*

- *The numbers on family violence are not going down. In fact, incidences of child abuse seem to be going up. The Navy should be looking at overall effectiveness. Is the clinical treatment approach good, or should we be taking a much more punitive approach? Perhaps we should handle domestic violence like we do drugs, zero-tolerance.*

- *There needs to be more education and awareness of Domestic Violence on the part of the Senior Navy Leadership. We need more support from the very top to make things better.*

- *Our current philosophy of dealing with domestic violence is too permissive-too many repeat offenders. We need a stronger approach.*

- *We need to provide unit commanders with a greater awareness of domestic violence issues. They don't take it seriously enough. Training for all should be mandatory.*

- *There are too many mandated programs, which are underfunded. If we want to be effective in our overall efforts to reduce or control domestic violence of all types, we must provide adequate funding without taking away from other valuable QOL programs.*

- *To successfully conduct our programs, it's critical that funding is not only increased, but made more reliable so that we can plan accordingly.*

- *We urgently need the creation of some organization within the Navy that specifically targets drug and alcohol prevention for teens. This is a real gap in our approach to controlling violence.*

- *We desperately need adolescent substance abuse counseling programs.*

- *The reporting system is much too burdensome, there are too many reports. The number should be drastically reduced.*

• Some kind of statistical process to measure prevention program effectiveness needs to be developed. It's the only way we can develop good prevention programs that work. At present, all we have are testimonials.

Director of Housing

Of the recommendations mentioned by Directors of Housing, most involved generating more interest and awareness in the growing problem of domestic violence. Also mentioned were problems with inter-organizational coordination, and the need to track trends in domestic violence.

• *Headquarters need to be encouraged to have a greater awareness of the housing problems associated with increasing base size.*

• *Ship CO's should be encouraged to pay more attention to problems with their sailors and officers in the housing areas.*

• *We need to generate more command interest in domestic violence and it's prevention.*

• *We need a way to change resident's expectations that they are going to be completely taken care of, and need to do nothing for themselves.*

• *We need to encourage greater cooperation between Housing, Family Service Centers, our residence, and the Police in order to more effectively prevent, and deal with, domestic violence.*

• *We need a better handle on trends in domestic violence so that we can anticipate, and coordinate new programs.*

In summary, a broad range of recommendations and suggestions were offered. Some were specific to the operation of a particular program, command, or type of position. Others dealt with more systemic changes, such as strengthening policies regarding domestic violence. While some suggestions would more likely be acted upon than others, all of the recommendations reflect the desire of those involved in these programs to improve their ability to control crime and violence in the Navy.

Conclusions

In an attempt to better understand the nature of unwanted violence and the Navy's response to it, this study relied on perceptions and observations of individuals formally involved with control, prevention, and the treatments of the consequences of violence. Obviously, more objective data such as crime and violence statistics or records indicating trends would be desirable in analyzing these issues. However, crime and violence statistics in general have been found to be a less than adequate source of information (Cox and Leather, 1994). Existing statistics and measures are seen as flawed because:

1. They are susceptible to bias in the reporting of violence or crime, in its recording and its classification.

2. There exists a general under-reporting of crime and violence.

3. There is a lack of uniformity across types of crime making generalization difficult.

Therefore although the information obtained in this study should be viewed with some caution, the information obtained from alternative sources are also problematic. Several themes emerged from the interviews. First, the breadth of the efforts to prevent and control crime and violence Navy-wide is impressive. The crime prevention programs available to commands are comprehensive, encompassing a magnitude of topics. The diversity of services provided by Security, Crime Prevention programs, and FSCs speaks to the complexity and magnitude of the problem of violence and the Navy's recognition of the problem.

Second, the professionals responsible for providing these services are dedicated, strongly committed, and proactive in their attempts to remove or reduce the risks of violence. Most who were interviewed felt that they are reasonably effective, but feel the removal of certain obstacles would allow them to do an even better job.

Several of the obstacles identified by the interviewees, which are systemic in nature, pose special problems. Reorganization and downsizing, for example, seriously affect their ability to control and prevent violence, not only because of the reduction in personnel and resources for security and crime prevention, but also because of the potential for increased levels of violence. Support exists for this contention; in a study designed to identify groups at high risk of domestic violence, abuse tended to escalate at Army bases scheduled to shut down (Thompson, 1994). Furthermore, the reorganization that has been underway, the increasing movement toward privatization of some of the services, and the reluctance and/or apathy of significant segments of the Navy community to take personal responsibility for control and prevention of violence seriously erode the sentiments of "we-ness" or "family" that have been part of the Navy tradition.

Third, despite the formal Navy policy that supports security and crime prevention programs, the interviewees reported that there are indications of less than full support and sufficient awareness of violence prevention efforts on the part of Navy leadership and, to some extent, sailors and their families. This is particularly evident regarding participation in FAP programs, which are characterized as punitive and a career destroyer. The control and treatment of violence, thus, becomes problematic when such inconsistencies exist (cf. Himmel, 1994).

Fourth, with some exceptions such as three research and evaluation projects conducted by the Navy Family Advocacy Program -- Spouse Assault/Treatment Study, Incestuous Abuser Follow-up Study, and the Survey of Recruits' Behaviors -- sponsored by the Personal, Family, and Community Support Division (Pers-66), as well as a study dealing with work stress management, more research evaluation initiatives are needed. Inadequate evaluation data for the majority of crime prevention efforts makes it impossible to assess with certainty the effectiveness of current approaches. The need to

focus limited resources on the delivery of services precludes the allocation of funds necessary to perform methodologically sound evaluations. In addition, it is difficult to measure the benefits of prevention programs due to many factors that influence the occurrence of violence among military members and their families.

Finally, the success of a program at a particular site, in large measure, is a result of the dedication and ingenuity of the individuals running the program. The interviewees related situations in which individuals displayed the initiative and determination to overcome impediments affecting successful operation of the program.

Recommendations

Based on the information obtained in this study of Navy violence prevention programs, the following recommendations are made.

1. Restructure the Navy law enforcement organization

It is recommended that an authority, similar to a Provost Marshal, be created at the level of the Chief of Naval Operations, with a chain of command extending down to Base Security Officer. This would produce an organization similar to that already existing in both the Army and the Air Force. Providing Base Security Officers with their own professional chain of command would serve to better insulate them from local command pressure and to elevate the status of the position.

2. Conduct additional evaluative research to determine the effectiveness of interventions designed to prevent or control violence.

Evaluation efforts can be successfully applied to any number of areas, including Crime Prevention activities, and to the various programs offered by the FSCs, and the Family Advocacy Program. Increased evaluation efforts in these areas, both in Crime Prevention and Family Services, would provide the Navy with more reasonable data with which to improve the allocation of scarce resources to programs with the highest probability of success. These efforts may be particularly useful at the local level in determining the effectiveness of specific programs.

Two possible proposals may be of particular use. The first involves research, which utilizes organizational audits of the management of violence. To be conducted at selected sites representative of Navy commands, the information derived from such an audit would not only increase understanding of an organization's response to violence, but would also provide input into the development of programs designed to control and prevent violence. The audit would include information dealing with organizational policies and procedures, environmental factors, and psychosocial factors. Listed below are the types of information that would be collected in an organizational audit:

Organizational policy

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Arrangement and procedures for monitoring and managing violence

Design of work systems and environments

Organizational culture and practices (attitudes and knowledge)

Post-incident support and referral

Education, training, and dissemination of information

Knowledge, skill, and attitudes relevant to coping with violence

The second proposal would be to develop a generalizable Navy evaluation system, which any local command could implement for the purpose of obtaining meaningful measures of the effectiveness of their violence prevention or control programs. The initial phase of this project would be to identify the critical decision-makers and practitioners for the control and prevention of violence, and the treatment of the consequences of violence at selected Navy commands. For each command or base selected, they would, in all likelihood, include the Commanding Officer (CO), Executive Officer (XO), Security Officer, FSC Director, FAP Director, SAVI Director, Hospital Administrator, Chaplain's Representative, and a representative from the Judge Advocate General (JAG). These individuals would either be interviewed separately, to identify indicators considered to be most useful for determining the effectiveness of programs under their cognizance, or brought together for information, or both. The data collected from all the locations would then be analyzed to determine which of the identified indices of effectiveness would be common to all.

Once general indices of program effectiveness common to all the sample sites have been identified, the second phase of the project could be initiated. A system to collect data on a regular basis; using reasonably uniform procedures, and in a readily analyzable format would be designed. Once completed, the system can be checked at a few locations before turnover to that portion of the Navy community concerned with the prevention and control of violence. Any local Navy activity would now have a tool-kit that provides them with the ability to assess program effectiveness across a variety of programs. The system would not only cover a number of different programs, but could also be designed to differentially weight the most critical indices, e.g. number of man-hours lost due to violence.

3. Develop a central Navy office to coordinate crime prevention efforts and serve as a resource center

Presently, the process by which information is disseminated about successful Crime Prevention programs and techniques is not well-established. Technically, a Navy office responsible for Crime Prevention activities exists within the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, but due to competing priorities, the level of effort is less than a full man-year. Therefore, we propose consideration of either expanding that office, or creating a new central Navy office to coordinate Crime Prevention efforts, facilitate the

exchange of information, and serve as an information resource center. It would provide training and other materials to Crime Prevention Coordinators on a "Just-in-Time" basis, and would encourage a productive interchange of relevant experiences and successes.

4. Develop a web site for crime and violence prevention

Currently there is wealth of information regarding violence and its prevention and treatment, but it is held by individuals at numerous locations throughout the world. By sharing information on the Internet regarding such topics as rates of violence, prevention and intervention programs, evaluation of violence prevention and treatment programs, and trends in violence, any site could obtain information to use in their program. This could save untold money and time by allowing Navy sites to adopt already proven programs instead of developing new ones. It also could provide sites with advanced information about trends in criminal activities so they could prepare early to repel them. Information could be easily reviewed on line or downloaded for further use. A second layer of information, protected by a security system, could contain any sensitive information and made accessible only to those with password accounts. This method of disseminating information would be particularly helpful to the afloat Navy, allowing them to quickly obtain information when deployed.

5. Establish a violence advisory group at the OPNAV level

The Navy's multidisciplinary approach to the control and treatment of violence, which is consistent with current theories of violence prevention, provides the variety of resources needed to address the many facets of the problem (e.g., from a security perspective, from a therapeutic perspective, etc.). However, the multidisciplinary approach increases the need for a coordinating mechanism to allow the various organizations and programs to operate smoothly in cooperation. It is recommended, therefore, that a Violence Advisory Group be established at the OPNAV level to accomplish better coordination of prevention and control efforts. The mission of such a group would be to generate policy for the prevention and control of violence. At a minimum, membership of the group would include representatives from law enforcement, family advocacy, family services, chaplains, family housing, and the JAG.

It is suggested that the group's operating charter allow it to function in a manner similar to the typical Case Review Committee, which has had significant success at local command levels. However, instead of dealing with problems presented by families or individuals, the responsibility of the Violence Advisory Group would be to consider emerging problems and trends, Navy-wide. For example, in the interviews conducted for the study, numerous people mentioned a concern for juvenile dependents that get into trouble, often with gangs, and for whom few or no programs are available. This is a Navy-wide problem, and the interviewees expressed a concern that it is not adequately being dealt with on a site-by-site basis. The Violence Advisory Group could coordinate the effort to share information and to develop strategies to overcome the problem.

6. Strengthen awareness of the importance of violence prevention and control in the Navy

We found that, although local commanders and ship Commanding Officers were basically supportive, and certainly not opposed to violence prevention and control programs, a number of them were reported to be unaware of how seriously the consequences of violence could affect not only the individual or family, but also their overall operational effectiveness. It is recommended, therefore, that the educational efforts dealing with violence prevention and control be intensified, particularly with respect to the Navy's leaders. Any of such programs offered to leaders should encourage a greater awareness and appreciation of the possible consequences of not controlling violence. In addition, consistent with the concept of community policing, sailors and their dependents should be encouraged to assume greater personal responsibility for the prevention and control of violence.

7. Eliminate redundant and unnecessary reporting requirements.

Reporting requirements from the local to headquarters levels are seen as overly involved and excessive. This is especially true for programs and activities associated with the FSCs. To the extent that excessive reporting requirements exist, they can have a negative effect on organizational performance. In an environment of downsizing and reduced staffing, time devoted to responding to other than necessary headquarters information requirements reduces the time available for program or treatment execution. It is recommended that an internal study of the reporting process be initiated. From a reengineering perspective, if "non-value-added work" is identified, i.e., redundancies, or unnecessary steps, the reporting structure should be streamlined.

A Final Note

The interviews conducted and information collected for this study clearly demonstrated that there is a dedicated group of individuals from a variety of disciplines working to control and prevent violence involving Navy members and their families. Many efforts are underway worldwide to address this important concern, and, although measurement of program effectiveness is scarce, the benefits of systematic measurement are apparent. Problems were identified in this study, however, that undermine the ability of the existing approaches to deal with all aspects of violence as it affects the military family. The recommendations presented in this report are designed to improve and minimize those problems. By addressing the problems and implementing recommended changes to the violence prevention and control effort, the Navy can improve and enhance the quality of life and morale of its members and their families now and in the future.

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Appendix A

Structured Interview

Structured Interview:
Questions about Security and Violence Control

Purpose

PERS 8 is interested in identifying and categorizing the various violence control and prevention approaches and interventions that are currently used in the Navy. NPRDC was asked to conduct interviews with individuals who are involved in (responsible for) security management and crime prevention at various CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT Navy sites. We would like to ask you about the violence control programs at your facility and we appreciate your willingness to assist us in obtaining this information.

Confidentiality

If there is anything you say that you want to be "off the record" then we will not report it.

Personal Information:

1. What is your official title/position?

2. Do you have any responsibilities regarding security management/crime prevention? If so, briefly describe.

3. To whom do you report regarding your crime prevention responsibilities?

3a) In what format (written/ oral report)?

Violence Control Programs

4. List and describe the programs that are in place at your facility.
(What is the target focus, e.g. family? How are the programs staffed? How long has each program been in existence? Developed in-house? Other?)

4a). How are they interconnected/linked?

4b). Is training necessary and if so, has it been provided?

4c). What kind of documentation/materials are available?

5. In your opinion, how well implemented are these programs? (Do some programs work better than others? Which ones and why?)

6 Do you obtain feedback concerning program effectiveness?

6a). How do you know when approaches are effective?   (Are the effects measured?)

7. What problems or impediments have you encountered when trying to carry out programs: (If yes, please give examples)

Lack of documentation	Yes	No
Insufficient support from management	Yes	No
Lack of funding	Yes	No
Lack of training material	Yes	No
Need for coordination/integration with other organizations and service community groups	Yes	No
Navy Community does not see a need for program	Yes	No

8 What special challenges do you face in this particular job with respect to crime prevention/violence control?   What type of skills does it require?

9. Are there any emerging problem areas that you sense?

9a). Do present programs address them? How?

10. Any observations or recommendations?

Appendix B

Violence Prevention and Control Programs at Commands Participating in the Study

First Level Programs: Policing and Primary Deterrence	Organizational Source
1: Community Oriented Policing	
Bike Patrol	S/CP Officer
Investigations	S/CP Officer
Neighborhood Watch	S/CP Officer, Housing
Regular Police Patrols	S/CP Officer
Safe Havens for Children	Housing
Special Police Patrol for Navy Housing	Housing
Volunteer Citizen Patrol	S/CP Officer/Housing
2: General Deterrence	
Bike Registration	S/CP Officer
Christmas Crime Prevention	Housing
Home Security	S/CP Officer
I.D. Checks	Housing
Lost Key Service	Housing
Office Security	S/CP Officer
Physical Security Checks	S/CP Officer, Housing
Property I.D.	S/CP Officer
Security Assessment	S/CP Officer

S/CP Officer: Security Officer/ Crime Prevention Coordinator; **FSC:** Family Service Center; **Housing:** Director of Housing

Second Level Programs: Briefs, Workshops and Education Programs	Organizational Source
Anger Management Workshop	FSC
Briefs for Teens (Sexual Abuse/Rape Awareness/Gangs/Peer Pressure)	FSC
Child at Risk (Neglect Awareness and Prevention)	S/CP Officer
Command Education: Sexual Assault/Child and Spousal Abuse	FSC
Conflict Management Seminar	Housing, FSC
Crime Prevention Workshop	S/CP Officer
DARE/Drug Education/Just Say No	S/CP Officer, FSC
Dating Skills Seminar	FSC
Domestic Violence Briefs	S/CP Officer, Housing
Domestic Violence Workshop	S/CP Officer, Housing
Drug and Alcohol Awareness	S/CP Officer, FSC
Effective Communications Education	FSC
Family Advocacy Board	Sec Officer, FSC, Housing
Family Advocacy Program (FAP)	FSC
Financial Assistance Training and Counseling	FSC
Housing Eviction Review Board	FSC, Housing
Ident-a-Kid	S/CP Officer
Innocent Victim Personal Safety	S/CP Officer
Juvenile Programs	S/CP Officer
Kids Carnival	S/CP Officer
Marriage Counseling	FSC
McGruff	S/CP Officer, Housing
Mother Support	FSC
National Night Out	S/CP Officer, Housing
Neighborhood Advisory Board	Housing
Neighborhood Crisis Board	Housing
New Parent Support Team	FSC
On-Base Violence Review Committee	FSC
Pre-Mid-Post Deployment Counseling	S/CP Officer, FSC
Pre-Move In Counseling	Housing
Rape Awareness	S/CP Officer
Resident Relations Advocate	Housing
Return and Reunion Workshop	FSC
Self Defense for Women	FSC
Self Esteem for Kids	FSC
Spousal and Child Abuse Prevention Briefs	S/CP Officer, FSC
Spousal Assault Prevention Training	FSC
Stress Reduction Workshop	FSC
Suicide Prevention	FSC
Training for Ombudsman	FSC
Transition and Relocation Help	FSC
Violence Awareness Briefs	FSC
Violent Crime Information	S/CP Officer
Workplace Violence Prevention Programs	FSC
Youth and Community Out-Reach Program	FSC
Youth at Risk (Drug and Alcohol Awareness Program)	FSC
Youth Summer Employment Programs	FSC

S/CP Officer: Security Officer/ Crime Prevention Coordinator; **FSC:** Family Service Center; **Housing:** Director of Housing

Third Level Programs: Victim and Perpetrator Services	Organizational Source
Adults Molested as Children	FSC
Battery Therapy/Victims and Batterers	FSC
Children Who Witness Violent Crime	FSC
Crisis Management for Rape/SAVI	FSC
Family Advocacy Program (FAP)	FSC
Marriage Counseling	FSC
Misconduct/Eviction Board	Housing
Support Group for Battered Women	FSC
Victim Services Specialist	FSC

S/CP Officer: Security Officer/ Crime Prevention Coordinator; **FSC:** Family Service Center; **Housing:** Director of Housing

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